A positive agenda for work and welfare

Issue date

24 May 2006

A positive agenda for work and welfare

The TUC response to A New Deal for Welfare

Introduction

In January the Department for Work and Pensions published A New Deal for Welfare: empowering people to work, the government's Green Paper designed as 'the beginning of what must be a national debate on the future direction of our welfare reforms.' [1]

The TUC strongly welcomes this invitation to a debate that we have sought for a long time. In 1999, for instance, Congress agreed a General Council statement on 'Welfare Reform' that called for 'a national fundamental debate on the welfare state.' [2] This has remained a TUC objective, and, in October 2005, the TUC wrote to the then Secretary of State, offering TUC assistance in promoting a dialogue with the public and with civil society.

The TUC is therefore very keen to take part in this debate, and this submission is our initial contribution. Because the Green Paper calls for a debate on the future direction of welfare reform - and not just for responses to the proposals in the Green Paper - this submission tackles general objectives, as well as specific policies. This submission is, of course, designed to be read by Ministers and officials, but it is also intended to promote debate amongst trade unionists. It therefore provides a summary of the Green Paper and outlines TUC policy on promoting work opportunities for economically inactive people, and these sections will be used in a discussion paper to be discussed at this year's TUC Disability Conference, due to be addressed by the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions.

It also, of course, makes specific comments on, and asks a series of questions about, the proposals in the Green Paper. We begin by summarising and commenting on the Green Paper, and conclude with a summary of our positive approach, and a three point plan for helping disabled people into employment.

Summary

The government has, for some time, been preparing for a new round of substantial welfare reform, addressing benefits policy for working age people who are out of work and on benefit, but not classified as unemployed, and especially focusing on Incapacity Benefit. In the period leading up to the publication of the Green Paper, A New Deal for Welfare: empowering people to work, there were media leaks suggesting that a much tougher benefit regime for sick and disabled people was planned. The TUC has responded by arguing for a supportive approach, expanding a successful pilot project and investing in active labour market programmes for disabled people.

The TUC has also been concerned about some of the missing elements of the debate so far. Firstly, in all the debates about the rights and responsibilities of disabled people there has been very little mention of employers' duties. But we know that discrimination is a major cause of the lower employment rates disabled people face, that extra attention paid to prevention and rehabilitation could make a significant difference to the scale of the problem, and that fair and flexible work opportunities could open up many jobs to sick and disabled people and others currently outside the labour market.

Secondly, there has been very little discussion about how the government intends to deliver its planned reforms. This is the subject of the least developed section of the Green Paper, and it is not entirely clear what is planned; but it does seem that some measure of privatisation is a very real possibility. The extension of Pathways to Work is to be delivered by private and voluntary sector organisations, and it is likely that the plans for cities will involve further contracting-out of work. This would put at risk the employment of sick and disabled people and undermine Britain's capacity to plan social policy delivery rationally. We are also concerned that no guarantees have been given about the jobs of people currently working in Jobcentre Plus.

Thirdly, there is a real danger of under-resourcing this stage of reform. The only additional resource that has been identified is £360m, earmarked for the extension of the Pathways to Work programme. Every commentator is agreed that the dramatic expansion of assessments outlined in the Green Paper will require substantial further investment.

The TUC also sees the Green Paper as an opportunity for articulating a positive approach, moving from the old paternalism and the more recent - but equally old-fashioned - managerialism, towards a vision of enabling welfare. The welfare state, if it is to survive, must address the challenges of an ageing population, globalisation and rising inequality and meet people's aspirations for more satisfying, healthy and fairly rewarded work.

The TUC response to A New Deal for Welfare that has been written in the light of these concerns; it addresses the specific points in the Green Paper but also attempts to present the TUC's own reform agenda. It builds on the General Council's 1999 statement to Congress on 'Welfare Reform', and argues the following points:

Responses to the Green Paper

The aspiration of an 80% employment rate is welcomed.
The notion that there is an Incapacity Benefit 'crisis' is mistaken, and the TUC worries when ministers talk of a 'crackdown' on claimants; we would oppose cuts, time limits or replacing part of claimants' IB with vouchers for services.
The Green Paper is to be welcomed to the extent that it puts more emphasis on support than compulsion, but unions would be particularly concerned should obligations to be available for work or to accept job offers be imposed on sick and disabled people.
But unions do want the government to invest in support for the many IB claimants who would prefer to be in employment.
The announcements on rehabilitation and returning people to work are positive, have been pre-announced, and the TUC welcomes them (though we would prefer to put the emphasis on prevention).
The abolition of Statutory Sick Pay 'waiting days' and their associated paperwork is very progressive; we would, however, strongly oppose keeping the waiting days but removing the current information obligations for employers - which are necessary to operate waiting days fairly.
The planned reform of Incapacity Benefit will require a large increase in the scope and number of assessments of claimants which would be acceptable if adequately resourced, otherwise the reforms should not go ahead. The cuts in funding for DWP mean that this is a very important cause for concern.
There are no figures for benefit levels in the new system, but it is already planned that people moving off SSP and on to the new Employment and Support Allowance will face a temporary but substantial fall in their incomes, and the TUC opposes this.
The TUC is also concerned that the new Allowance will have discriminatory lower rates of benefit for young people. This is unfair age discrimination and will be especially problematic for people with severe impairments, who make up a high proportion of those who become disabled when young.
Trades unionists will welcome the new work-related activity premium for lone parents, but we are concerned that the increased conditionality being applied to lone parents may endanger the New Deal for lone parents, which has been very successful as a voluntary programme.
The TUC opposes the government's plans for contracting-out and privatisation. As a trade union centre we have a legitimate concern about the impact on Jobcentre Plus staff in addition to worries about the impact on claimants and on the DWP's ability to deliver coherent services. Voluntary organisations that tender for work currently delivered by JCP may also find their position compromised.

The TUC agenda

The notion that Incapacity Benefit is out of control is mistaken. Beliefs that there is widespread IB fraud or that malingering is commonplace are wrong.
Disability benefits are inadequate, falling far short of the level needed to make sure that beneficiaries can lead a healthy life.
When barriers to equality are removed, disabled people are capable of competing for available jobs on an equal basis with non-disabled people. Although progress has been made, there is still a long way to go before we can say that effective equality has been achieved, and all the evidence we have suggests that IB claimants who try to get jobs find it much more difficult than JSA claimants. It would not therefore be fair to subject sick and disabled people to the same obligations as unemployed people.
The Pathways to Work pilot scheme has been a great success, proving the superiority of a supportive approach to moving IB claimants into employment.
Discrimination by employers is a massive barrier to employment for disabled people, including IB claimants. It needs to be addressed by a balance of clear legal duties and extra support - such as a better-publicised Access to Work scheme.

A three-point plan

The TUC agenda is summed up in a three-point plan for helping disabled people into jobs:

Prevention - especially by designing out workplace problems likely to lead to ill-health or impairment,
Retention - every employer should have a return to work plan for workers who become sick or disabled,
Intervention - quick intervention and continuing support from Jobcentre Plus can help IB claimants and other sick and disabled people to get and keep jobs.

Comments on the green paper

General comments

The Green Paper starts by setting out the government's understanding of where we are at present. Helping working age people into paid work is the centrepiece of the government's anti-poverty strategy, and real progress has been made on this objective since 1997. There are now 2.3 million more people in work, and policies such as the New Deal programmes, the National Childcare Strategy and increased rights for disabled people have all made a significant contribution. But much remains to be done, especially for workless families and economically inactive individuals, especially those receiving Incapacity Benefit. The government has declared that it has an aspiration of raising the employment rate from 75% to 80%; this will mean reducing the numbers on IB by 1 million, helping 300,000 lone parents into employment and increasing the number of older workers by 1 million. The organising principles for the reforms to achieve this will continue to be a balance of rights and responsibilities and 'work for those who can, support for those who cannot.'

The TUC strongly supports the government's aspiration towards an eighty percent employment rate. In 1994 the TUC challenged the political parties to commit themselves to achieving full employment as a prime economic goal. At the time we were widely ridiculed, full employment, we were told, was never again going to be a realistic policy. Today, with an employment rate of 75%, full employment no longer seems an unreasonable objective. So the TUC will never criticise the government for setting itself challenging employment objectives. Unemployment is a major cause of ill health, social exclusion and poverty, and we wholeheartedly welcome the 80% aspiration.

We are less happy with the Green Paper's assumption that there is an Incapacity Benefit crisis. In the concluding section of this document we tackle this belief. The number of IB and SDA claimants is falling, not rising, and the number of beneficiaries is falling even faster; the number of claimants mirrors developments in health and disability and levels of IB fraud are remarkably low.

This is why the TUC has taken the view that there is no need for a more coercive system of benefits for sick and disabled people. Over the past two years we have been increasingly concerned about media stories suggesting that there was going to be a 'crackdown' on Incapacity Benefit, with claimants facing benefit cuts, and being required to be available for work, just like unemployed people receiving Jobseeker's Allowance. We know, from reports from our affiliated unions, and from our network of fifty Unemployed Workers' Centres, that every time stories like that appear in the newspapers, the following day union representatives and UWC staff will receive anxious enquiries from claimants, worried they are going to be left without any benefits.

Shortly before the publication of the Green Paper the TUC therefore set out [3] a number of standards by which the reform plans could be judged:

A supportive approach to work and disability. It was very important for us that harsh reforms, such as replacing benefits with vouchers, means-testing and time limits should not be introduced, even though seemingly authoritative media stories had claimed that they were being considered seriously.
No JSA-style availability for work obligations.
The expansion of the Pathways to Work programme.
A role for employers, recognising the significance of discrimination as a barrier to employment.
Guaranteeing Jobcentre Plus the resources to implement the reform proposals.

It has to be said, that, by these standards, the Green Paper deserves high marks. The regressive reforms that had been suggested by the media did not materialise. We still have some questions, which we come to below, but it does seem that people on incapacity benefits are not to be required to be available for employment, and will not be penalised for turning down job offers. The Pathways to Work programme is to be expanded nationwide, and there is some recognition of the importance of employers' obligations, though the Green Paper does not go as far in this respect as we would like. The biggest questions remaining are whether sufficient resources have been made available for these ambitious plans, and what the delivery arrangements will be.

Health and safety proposals

To reduce the number of IB claimants the Green Paper plans to cut the numbers who leave work due to illness and increase the numbers leaving benefit, whilst at the same time offering extra support for all those on benefit - extra help returning to work for most and 'additional payments to the most severely disabled people.' The first element of the strategy is to stop people getting health problems that take them out of work, and where they do to help them stay in work. The key element here is Health, work and well-being, published in October. The focus is on creating partnerships to create healthy workplaces; give all employees access to occupational health; getting health professionals to recognise the importance of work for well-being; ensuring 'the development of appropriate return-to-work support.' [4] The experience of the Job Retention and Rehabilitation Pilot suggests that there is a great deal of progress still to be made on these fronts:

'Staff perceived employers as being resistant to being in contact with them and did not always allow access to workplaces. Where contact was established, not all employers were thought to be interested in helping employees back to work. Employers were perceived by staff as less supportive where they did not understand the effects of particular illnesses, or where employees' health conditions were undiagnosed and the duration of their absence was unknown. Being inflexible and not forward-thinking were criticisms made of employers who would not consider rehabilitation plans including lighter duties and phased returns.' [5]

The government will work with the insurance industry 'together with employers and trade unions,' to try to use Employers' Liability Compulsory Insurance as an incentive to employers to provide increased health support. The government also wants GPs and other healthcare professionals to 'understand the importance of work in recuperation and the negative impacts of being out of work and can support and assist people to remain in or return to work.' [6] There will be initiatives to link to employment advice, for instance with employment advisers in GPs' surgeries.

The TUC has for a long time demanded extra resources for occupational rehabilitation, and therefore supported Health, work and well-being. We have particularly welcomed the way in which employers and employees are encouraged to work in partnership to solve issues of occupational ill-health, and i n December the TUC organised a seminar to examine the strategy's practical consequences. The TUC has always emphasised, however, that the top priority must be to prevent people being made ill or being injured in the first place.

Statutory Sick Pay

There are specific plans for Statutory Sick Pay reform, which the Green Paper presents in the section on prevention, rather than the main section on benefit reforms. The government is concerned about the complicated records employers have to keep to make SSP work, and plans to remove the need for most of them by abolishing the current three waiting days before an employee becomes entitled to SSP, which will now be 'payable on the first day a person is sick for work.' [7]

This is a tremendously welcome proposal. Ten years ago, during a previous consultation on SSP, the TUC argued that the easiest way to simplify this benefit would be to abolish the waiting days. For those workers in low paid or unorganised industries, who have to rely on SSP, the cut represented by not getting it for three days can be a serious problem. Requiring employers to pay from day one should also encourage them to be more careful about managing absence.

Some business spokespeople have suggested that the linking rules (and their associated paperwork) could be abolished but the waiting days retained; unions would oppose this - the linking rules are needed to protect vulnerable workers who would otherwise be unfairly penalised by waiting days. The proposals in the Green Paper as it stands are the only fair way forward for Statutory Sick Pay.

Incapacity Benefit reform

The central feature of the Green Paper is the plan to withdraw the 'incapacity benefits' (this term is often used even though it can be rather confusing, as it actually covers two benefits, one of which is called Incapacity Benefit, the other being means-tested Income Support for disabled people of working age); a new Employment and Support Allowance is due to replace them in 2008. For most people the new benefit will be conditional upon taking part in work-focused interviews and completing an action plan, which will include work-related activities. Those who fail to do this will face a reduction in their benefit, eventually to the same level as Jobseeker's Allowance. People whose conditions have the most severe impact will not face the same obligations, and will receive a higher level of benefit. Existing claimants will remain on their current benefit level, but they will be required to attend work-focused interviews more frequently, and, like other claimants, have to attend regular Personal Capability Assessments 'to gauge whether their condition has changed or improved.' There will also be random case checks 'carried out by a dedicated team which will be specially created for this purpose.' [8] By the time the new benefit is introduced, the government intends to have completed a nationwide extension of the Pathways to Work programme (which currently covers a third of the country).

The Green Paper introduces the Earnings and Support Allowance, which will replace Incapacity Benefit and Income Support with a disability premium for working age disabled people. This is the most controversial and widely discussed section of the Green Paper, and this response addresses the plans under four headings: assessments, action plans, benefit rates and fraud.

Assessments

The Personal Capability Assessment (the gateway to IB) is to be reformed to give 'a professional assessment of an individual's eligibility for financial support based on their functional capability' and to identify the people for whom 'work-related activity' is appropriate (and for whom it will be mandatory), and those for whom it would be unreasonable to require such activity.

Like other organisations, we welcome the planned shift from assessing the severity of impairment to the severity of the impact of the impairment on the ability to function. This is a move towards using a social definition of disability, and recognises the fact that you cannot 'read off' a person's ability to do a job from a medical diagnosis of their condition. A fully social definition would also incorporate into assessments the impact of local labour market conditions and other personal factors, but the Green Paper unfortunately does not go that far.

The government plans to 'work with health professionals, personal advisers and disability groups (including the Disability Rights Commission and the Disability Employment Advisory Committee) to ensure that the transformed assessment process is fair and equitable in application and operation.'

This will be a key point. With the increased conditionality we discuss below, getting the assessment right will be absolutely vital. Even the OECD, which led the way in calling on governments to increase the level of conditionality in incapacity benefits, recognises that the definition of people for whom this is not reasonable is a very difficult matter, and that assessments - making this definition operational - will be even more difficult. This problem is confirmed by new research by Prof Richard Berthoud, [9] which found that there is 'no clear dividing line between disabled people who can work and those who cannot.' The study concludes with three significant sentences on the implications for policy:

'Perhaps, though, the analysis should encourage government to adopt rather less ambitious targets, at least in the short run. If it was thought that 'most' IB claimants had minor impairments, it might have been hoped that 'most' of their employment disadvantage could be eliminated, and that the majority of claimants could return to work. Reducing employment disadvantage seems a more realistic objective, which would result in 'many' more claimants returning to work. ' [10]

From talking to welfare rights and disability organisations, the TUC is well aware of the extreme level of concern about this issue. The National Autistic Society's comments are typical of the concerns expressed by organisations representing different impairment groups:

'It is a frequent complaint that assessments such as these are not appropriately designed to account for the needs of people with autism and as a consequence it is felt that the difficulties an individual with autism may have are not sufficiently taken account of. ... The health professional involved in the PCA often has little or no understanding of autism and how it impacts on the day to day lives of people. This leads to inappropriate, confusing and irrelevant questions and as a result the PCA does not reflect the true experience of those adults with autism.' [11]

The Department has got this wrong several times in the past, often through failing to invest adequately in disability training for officials. As Mind has commented, 'the system is totally inadequate as a way of imposing a decision of such profound consequences.' [12] PCA medical examinations (more than half a million are carried out each year by Atos Origin for the DWP) are particularly problematic. The National Association of CABx' recent report What the Doctor Ordered? noted Atos Origin's tendency to carry out rushed or incomplete examinations, which are then relied upon to deny claimants benefit. NACAB noted that 'doctors frequently appear not to give sufficient consideration to mental health problems' and are even 'reporting incorrectly what the claimant has said about their own conditions.' [13] As the National Audit Office has commented 'with a fifth of benefit decisions containing errors of some kind [there is] scope for improvement in the quality of decision making.' [14] The TUC is particularly concerned that medical reports that have been graded in audit at 'C' ('key requirements are not satisfied to the extent that the product fails to meet Medical Services Professional Standards') have been used to deny claimants their benefits. [15] These problems indicate that use of private companies is not always a guarantee of high standards, and set an unacceptable standard that must be bettered if the proposed reforms are to be operated fairly.

It cannot be emphasised enough that this new benefit system can only be operated fairly if the assessments are fair and accurate and that this will require extra resources. The only new resources identified for the Green Paper (raised from savings on information technology) are £360m already earmarked for the extension of Pathways to Work. Unless extra resources are identified in the Spending Review the assessments cannot be operated fairly, and the planned benefit reform should not be proceeded with. The TUC would oppose any attempt to introduce the reforms without adequate funding. Assessments cannot be done 'on the cheap' by farming them out to specialist voluntary organisations and charities, as these organisations are dubious about whether it would be right for them to engage in such an exercise, which might endanger the support of their key constituency.

A further cause of concern is the position of people with fluctuating conditions. The Green Paper is quite vague on this subject: 'personal advisers should, wherever possible, agree appropriate action which reflects these variations.' [16] It is a great pity that the government does not plan to reform the rules relating to the use of Income Support disregards - the amount of money people are allowed to earn before it affects their benefits. These disregards currently stand at £20 a week for disabled people, a level which is hardly ever uprated, and which does not promote independence. For people whose conditions are too unpredictable for them to risk leaving benefit for a permanent job a liberating reform would allow them to 'bundle up' their current weekly disregards so they can use them to cover casual or occasional work - often all they are capable of at present.

The Green Paper is also hazy on the subject of how the new system will treat people with partial capacity for work - fewer hours per day, days per week or with reduced output. A truly flexible system would help people to combine work and benefits; unfortunately, the tax credit system can only help those capable of regularly working at least sixteen hours a week.

Access arrangements

Disability-specific organisations are better placed to make detailed comments on access arrangements than the TUC. We share their concern, however, that the new system cannot be operated fairly unless each stage is fully accessible. With greater conditionality and the introduction of sanctions to disability benefits on a greater scale than ever before access has become a crucial procedural justice issue. Information materials and forms should therefore be available in the full range of accessible formats; work-focused interviews and other meetings with JCP staff (or officials of other organisations on contract to JCP) should be accessible, medical assessments, provision detailed in an action plan and appeals arrangements should all be accessible. This includes documentation available in alternative formats, sign language interpretation and/or palantype, wheelchair accessible buildings and rooms, trained and aware staff. It is not enough that accessible forms should be available; forms completed in Braille, on tape or submitted electronically should be accepted.

None of this can be taken for granted, even though disabled people have been making these points to the Department for some time. During our discussion of the Green Paper, for instance, a member of the TUC's Disability Committee reported that JCP refused to send him IB claim forms in electronic format. The accessible versions of the Green Paper itself were delayed - less than 24 hours for the Braille version, two weeks for large print and tape [17] - which does not augur well for the implementation of these reforms. The easy-read version was a month late in appearing, [18] and is arguably misleading in claiming that the Employment and Support Allowance will 'give extra money to people who try to do things to help them go back to work' [19] - it would be more accurate to say that it will 'pay less to people who won't do things that could help them get back to work.'

Action plans

In the new system, the majority of ESA claimants will be required to take part in work-related activities. Just what these activities will be will be determined by an action plan, similar to the Jobseeker's Agreement that JSA claimants have to sign, though with the crucial difference that claimants of ESA will not have to include looking for jobs in their Action Plan, whereas this is a mandatory element of all Jobseeker's Agreements.

In the second half of this paper, where we set out the TUC's positive policy agenda for welfare reform, we describe in some detail our position on the rights and responsibilities of disabled people. The TUC uses the social model of disability, and we believe that, in a barrier-free environment, disabled people have shown that they can compete for all jobs on an equal basis with non-disabled people. Were the environment normally to be barrier free, the case for disabled people to have equal duties, as well as equal rights would be very strong. We are a long way from such a situation: disabled people continue to face persistent discrimination, public investment in active labour market programmes for disabled people is inadequate and there is clear evidence that, in practice, disabled people (and especially those who are Incapacity Benefit recipients) find it much more difficult to get jobs than non-disabled unemployed people. We therefore believe that a fair policy is to provide generous support for all disabled people (including those claiming incapacity benefits) and strongly to encourage a return to employment, but that disabled people should not (unlike unemployed people) be required to be available for work or penalised if they turn down job offers.

Incapacity benefits are not only paid to disabled people, they are also paid to sick people - who may be disabled or non-disabled. Our view is that, when fully recovered, sick people should have the same obligations as they would have before being sick. But no-one should be required to work while suffering pain, fatigue or distressing mental states such as agitation, fear or confusion; no-one should be required to engage in work that would cause such problems and no-one should be required to engage in work that would exacerbate them if they already exist. As a group, disabled people are not disadvantaged by stress but some sick people (whether or not they are disabled) can be. That is why our concerns apply especially acutely in today's workplace, characterised by intensified pressure, a faster pace of work and less autonomy (workers' ability to control their own work environment). It seems unfair to us to talk about extra responsibilities for sick workers without, at the same time, mentioning employers' duty to address the problematic aspects of modern jobs.

Our view has been that the obligation to attend work-focused interviews is not unreasonable, and an obligation to engage in work-related activities - so long as this is not an obligation to apply for jobs or accept job offers - is not necessarily objectionable. But care must be exercised; generally speaking, we should be cautious about increased employment conditionality at a time when unemployment is creeping up again and the DWP has shrinking resources with which to help people. The key question for us is whether activities will genuinely be helpful to the individual sick or disabled person, and the extent to which work-related activities have a realistic chance of helping a claimant into employment. We have indicated above that the TUC could not support the proposed assessment regime unless adequate resources are made available to operate fairly. Equally, we could not support the conditionality regime if spending on employment programmes for disabled people fell from its already inadequate level; and the TUC would agitate stridently for an easing of conditionality if the UK ever saw a return of high levels of persistent unemployment.

The Green Paper gives examples of what might be considered suitable for inclusion in the action plan. [20] The TUC is worried that this includes 'i ndependent job searches ' - discussions with Ministers and officials have indicated that this would mean that people can put looking for jobs in their action plan, and we would not object to that. But we would welcome a guarantee that this does not mean that Personal Advisers would be able to decide that applying for jobs must go in a claimant's action plan. This would put ESA claimants onto a JSA regime, even though the evidence (see below) suggests that they would find it much more difficult to get jobs than unemployed people.

There is also a worrying set of items that can be included in action plans under the heading of 'stabilising life'; these include 'Activities to stabilise health conditions (including mental health problems), for example use of cognitive behavioural therapy.' The prospect of being told 'take your medication/go to your psychiatrist sessions or lose your benefit' will worry many people with mental health conditions, especially those who would see themselves as survivors of the mental health system, rather than users of mental health services. We would doubt whether a generalist Atos doctor would ever be likely to be trained to the point where s/he could make a judgement about what may reasonably be demanded of someone in these circumstances. Fortunately, a recent answer to a Parliamentary Question by the Minister for Work suggests that the government recognises the force of this concern. Although the question related to the position of drug users, the logic of the Minister's answer is clearly applicable to disabled people:

'Our assessment is that making participation in a rehabilitation scheme compulsory for incapacity benefit claimants who misuse drugs would be inappropriate. ...

'Medical treatment can be agreed as part of a claimant's action plan. This is because an individual can volunteer to undertake treatment (whether of their own volition or by persuasion from a personal adviser) as happens in Pathways. However, for a health care professional to carry out a medical intervention, there must be patient consent. That consent must be informed consent, given freely. In law, consent given under duress is not given fully and freely and the fear of losing benefit could amount to duress. This means that we cannot sanction a claimant for not undertaking medical treatment if they decided they did not want to do it at any point in the process.' [21]

Furthermore, a footnote to a different section of the Green Paper's table of action plan activities states that 'not participating in a medical intervention would not be subject to benefit sanction.' [22] It would be very helpful if the Department could confirm our interpretation that this promise also applies to the section on 'stabilising life', and to mental health service users in particular.

The TUC is also concerned about a possible implication of the section of the Green Paper on delivery arrangements:

'The consortia will be required to operate within the new national benefits structure, including the proposed conditionality arrangements for new claimants. Once the new benefits structure is in place, the Government will consider proposals from pilot areas to trial a range of conditionality and incentive structures for existing claimants. ' [23]

We would welcome a reassurance that 'trialling conditionality structures' does not mean trying out requiring that ESA claimants should be available for or actively seek employment. Furthermore, we would not be alone in being worried by the thought of private companies having the power to tell disabled people to apply for a job or lose their benefits - and having an incentive to do so.

The TUC believes that, subject to the qualifications listed in para 39, compulsory work-related activities can have a role to play in a fair benefit system; but there must be adequate safeguards as well. The Green Paper already mentions some - the new system will apply to new, not existing claimants, and claimants will, of course, have the right to appeal against decisions. We would also wish to see a guarantee that people who fail to comply with their action plan for a reason associated with their condition or impairment will not be penalised.

We would also encourage the government, when legislating, to include a statutory guarantee that sick and disabled people on the brink of being sanctioned will be sent reminder letters, pointing out the risk of losing some of their benefit and describing the actions they must take to bring themselves back into compliance with the rules. It would also be helpful if such reminder letters included details of local advice agencies - claimants who may not entirely trust Jobcentre Plus may well believe an independent agency when it tells them they must attend a work-focused interview, agree an action plan and carry out the activities in their plan.

We are also interested in the position of people who have been on the new regime for a year or more, and are plainly getting nowhere. It would be cruel to make them go through a routine of courses and other work-related provisions that are not helping them into jobs. We urge the government to ensure that, in these circumstances, claimants move to a self-management regime, with looser obligations in their Action Plan.

Benefit rates

The Green Paper does not give any rates for the new benefit structure, but it is already clear that there will be both gainers and losers when compared with the current system. The Green Paper promises to 'protect the level of benefits of existing claimants', [24] who will not be on the ESA, but concerns remain. It is best to consider new claimants under six headings -

Carers and bereaved people. The Green Paper says that the basic allowance element of the new Employment and Support Allowance will be 'set at basic Jobseeker's Allowance level'. [25] It is not entirely clear whether this would include the carer's and bereavement premiums. Unions would be extremely distressed if it did not.
Young people. The 'basic rate' of Jobseeker's Allowance varies by age, with a discriminatory lower rate paid to under-25s, and a lower rate still for under 18s. [26] Incapacity Benefit, by contrast does not pay a lower rate, and people who become disabled when young will also be losing out on the age additions (see below). To compensate for this, the additional payments for work-related activities or for the most severely ill/disabled will have to be worth at least £40 a week simply to ensure that young people are no worse off than they would be under the current system, let alone comply with the promise that they will be better off.
- There is a real danger that, for a young disabled person, their 18^th birthday could become a crisis point. Transferring from youth to adult social services can already be a difficult time, with service providers, the services offered and the basis of entitlement all changing. Young people often find that they are no longer going to receive services they have relied on, or spend weeks without those services while the local authority decides who is now responsible for providing them. If they also have to cope with a much lower level of benefit then finding employment is likely to be the last thing on their minds.
- The TUC believes that the government should withdraw this proposal - age discrimination is one of the most objectionable features of JSA; if the two benefits are to be aligned, then IB should be the model, not Jobseeker's Allowance.
People waiting for the Personal Capability Assessment. Claimants who come off Statutory Sick Pay and are waiting for their assessment 'will receive the basic level of Jobseeker's Allowance.' [27] For most claimants this will be £12 less than SSP, which means that people who have been ill will find that, after 6 months, their income falls by 17.5%. The TUC opposes this provision, as this fall in income will be stressful, damaging to health and a cause of social exclusion. The government plans to carry out PCAs within 12 weeks, which means that people will be waiting for up to three months on this low level of income - if the government succeeds in hitting this target. If budget cuts cause longer waits the situation could be even more serious.
People with more severe impairments. After the PCA, a minority of claimants will receive the 'support' rate of the ESA, and not face the conditionality regime, which will be set at a higher rate than the long-term rate of IB and at a higher rate than Income Support with the basic disability premium.
- The means-tested version of the new benefit will therefore not include the disability premium, but the enhanced and severe disability premiums will continue to be available for those who qualify. The TUC is concerned about the position of couples who each qualify for the disability premium, and who currently receive a couple rate set at twice the individual rate - this issue is not addressed by the Green Paper, and we would welcome a guarantee that partners in such couples will qualify for the single person rate.
- In c ontributory ESA the IB age additions [28] and adult dependency increases will be abolished. The age additions are worth up to £16.05 and the adult dependency addition is worth £45.70. Unless the highest rate of ESA exceeds the long-term rate of IB by more than £60 a week it is therefore inevitable that even some people with the most severe conditions will be worse off than under the current system. Those who would not qualify for the additions under the current system, however, are likely to be better off under the new system.
- It is not clear whether people who become disabled early in life will continue to qualify for contributory benefit without meeting NIC conditions. As these are usually people with severe impairments the TUC would welcome a guarantee that they will continue to qualify for non - means-tested benefit.
- The Employment and Support Allowance is clearly modelled on Jobseeker's Allowance. The Green Paper does not address the question of whether it will copy JSA in having discriminatory lower rates for people under 25 - the TUC would oppose this.
People with less severe impairments who comply with the conditionality regime. The majority of ESA beneficiaries will, after their PCA, be placed on the Employment Support rate of benefit 'at a rate above the current long-term rate.' [29] This benefit will be conditional on compliance with the rules of the benefit - attending work-focused interviews, drawing up a personal action plan and carrying out the activities in the action plan. For those claimants who comply, when compared with the current system, there will be winners and losers under the new system. This is also true of those on the higher rate, though the proportion of losers is here likely to be somewhat higher.
People with less severe impairments who do not comply with the conditionality regime. People who fail to comply with these conditions will face benefit penalties up to, for repeated offences, a reduction in benefit to the JSA rate. They will be significantly worse off, which is why it is so important that the assessment of whether or not one should be exempted from the conditionality regime should be fair and accurate.

Ministers and officials have said that the reform proposals have not been designed to cut spending on disabled people. It would be very helpful if Ministers could guarantee that rates of the new benefit will be set to provide the same total level of spending on benefits for disabled people as at present.

Fraud

Existing claimants will remain on their current benefit level, but they will be required to attend work-focused interviews more frequently, and, like other claimants, have to attend regular Personal Capability Assessments 'to gauge whether their condition has changed or improved.' There will also be random case checks 'carried out by a dedicated team which will be specially created for this purpose.' Our experience suggests that these measures are going to cause a great deal of worry among innocent claimants, and we therefore believe that random checks are likely to do more harm than good.

These worries felt by innocent people arise because the relentless focus on fraud by benefit claimants has created a sense of suspicion about anyone living on benefit. We need to remember that people who receive benefits are less likely to commit fraud than, for instance, people who pay income tax:

Percentage of those eligible committing benefit and income tax fraud, 2003 [30]

Type of fraud	Percentage of eligible respondents
Income tax fraud	2.0%
Benefit fraud	1.8%

The total cost of benefit fraud to the country is commonly estimated at £2 bn per year. [31] The National Audit Office estimate for the cost of VAT and excise duty not collected because of fraud is £6.4 - £7.3 bn. [32] Income tax fraud is difficult to measure, but a cautious estimate would be about £10 bn. [33]

Lone parents

The Green Paper also looks at measures to promote employment for lone parents. There has been significant progress in increasing the employment rate of lone parents, though Britain still lags other European countries and the USA, and lone parents still have lower employment rates than parents with partners. The Green Paper argues that ' the Government should help make provision available to enable lone parents to work, but in return we believe that lone parents have a responsibility to make serious efforts to return to work, especially once their youngest child reaches 11. This will improve their own lives, and the lives of their children too.' [34]

The government therefore plans, 'as resources allow', to require lone parents whose youngest child is over 11 and who have received benefit for over a year to attend a work-focused interview every three months; for those whose youngest child is under 11 the obligation will be to attend an interview every six months. The government plans to introduce a work-related activity premium, worth £20 a week, for lone parents who 'undertake work-related activity agreed with a personal adviser,' [35] but is not decided about whether this should only be offered to lone parents whose youngest child is over 11.

The TUC welcomes the new work-related activity premium, more intensive support in the first year and work-taster programmes. The difficulty with the increased conditionality is that its beginning to affect a group whose youngest children are at an age when some parents will be happy to think about more time away from the home, but others will judge that, in the case of their children, its not right just yet, and this is another boundary it is difficult to police. The New Deal for lone parents has been a tremendous success - as a voluntary programme, and we are cautious about any changes that might endanger this success. Once again, there is a conflict between extra conditionality and reduced resources in JCP.

Delivery arrangements

The Green Paper states that these reforms 'will need to engage private and voluntary sector providers. We will invite bids for outcome-based contracts as we roll out Pathways to Work nationally.' [36] This is clear enough, but the plans for delivery in metropolitan areas (which we understand Ministers have great hopes for) are less so. The Green Paper envisages consortia of local partners working to align different funding streams covering skills, employment and health; 'this may include local authorities, employers, learning and skills councils, regional development agencies, primary care trusts and Jobcentre Plus ... each consortium will be expected to use private and voluntary sector providers to deliver additional investment and employment support under contract .' [37] Ministers have not yet guaranteed that JCP jobs are safe from redundancies over and above those needed to implement the efficiency review.

The TUC is worried about the possible threat to the continued existence of a public employment service in this country. Jobcentre Plus has benefited from working in partnership with voluntary sector organisations in delivering active labour market programmes, especially where these organisations have brought in expertise with particular client groups. This is an entirely different matter from handing the whole venture over to private and voluntary sector.

The TUC has entirely reasonable concerns about the jobs, pay and working conditions of civil servants. We fear that, in a system mainly delivered by the private and voluntary sector, companies and charities would eventually come to compete for contracts on the basis of lower pay, increases in unpaid overtime and in the pace and intensity of work, with deteriorating health and safety as a consequence. Such deterioration in thousands of people's jobs could not be a good outcome.

It is worth bearing in mind the fact that, in value-for-money comparisons with the private and voluntary sectors, the civil service faces a constraint that is missing for them. Non-state contractors have the flexibility to use savings in one part of their contract to pay for extra resources in another. When Jobcentre Plus, on the other hand, helps a client into a job earlier than expected the savings just disappear into a black hole, releasing no resources for innovation and experimentation. This is not an inevitable feature of public sector service delivery - one reason we supported the government's Building on New Deal proposals (a plan for radical decentralisation and personalisation of the New Deal programmes) was the opportunity they offered for incorporating greater flexibility into public active labour market programmes. BoND has, unfortunately, been on the back burner for some time, but we would wish to see it introduced as a step towards giving Jobcentre Plus the opportunity to compete on something more like equal terms.

Despite this disadvantage, the efficiency record of the public sector is actually rather good. When measured in terms of output per hour (the best efficiency measure of productivity) productivity in 1999 in UK non-market services was 19% higher than in the USA and 15% higher than in Germany. By contrast, in market services the UK was 30% behind the US and 17% behind Germany. This non-market sector performance was remarkable, given that investment was higher in these countries: capital per hour worked was 80% - 90% higher in Germany and the USA. [38]

The TUC is especially concerned about the possible impact of contracting out and privatisation on unemployed and economically inactive people, and the possibility of a 'race to the bottom.' This could happen, as the lowest price submitted by any competing agency could become the highest price other agencies would feel it was safe to bid; providers would then obviously find it in their interests to avoid spending more money than was needed to meet the minimum quality criteria specified in the contract. There would then be an incentive to move people off benefits quickly, which could lead to claimants being treated unfairly or harshly. Unions would therefore be particularly concerned about contractors being given the responsibility for making decisions about benefit sanctions.

This need to move people quickly into jobs to meet contract terms could also lead to over-reliance on entry-level jobs, regardless of whether or not this meets clients' aspirations; this in turn could bring more people into the 'low pay - no pay' cycle, as jobs that do not meet clients' aspirations tend not to be sustained. Another possible strategy would be for providers to identify the most job-ready clients, concentrate on them, whilst ignoring those with more problems - 'creaming' and 'parking' as this is known. If this happened there would be a risk that those groups subject to discrimination - such as black or disabled people - would be especially likely to be 'parked'.

The experience of Employment Zones suggests that these concerns are not unreasonable. Although the authors attempt to place their findings in a positive light, the results of the first qualitative evaluation of EZs were troubling, and the relevant paragraph is worth quoting in full:

'Another benefit of the Zone model, sometimes seen as a disadvantage, is that the Zones are forced to look seriously at the segmentation of their customer group. Output-related funding ensures that it is in the business interests of contractors to assess what their future income stream from clients might be, raising the danger of just 'maintaining' people who are a bad employment bet. However, the early assignment of broad job probabilities to individuals is an attempt to manage strategically the flow of investments to a diverse client group. The study found that output-related funding has encouraged:

'informal segmentation into clients 'job ready'; 'near job ready'; 'not job ready' or unemployable categories. The latter refers to those deemed unlikely to get jobs - and hence secure outcome payments - during the 26 weeks available to Step 2 (managers reporting between 25% and 40% of clients are in this group);
'a broad range of investment in the near and not job ready groups, although initial assessments often require adjusting as the PA develops more of a relationship with the client. From the start, Zone contractors have appreciated that the key to making profits has been to strike a balance between concentrating PA resources where they can make most difference and serving the needs of the wider client group;
'identification of a substantial minority with needs insurmountable within the time-scale and resources available. There are indications that these clients, particularly those with drug, alcohol or mental health problems, are also represented on mainstream programmes where the incidence of 'unemployable' clients is shielded by case management or referral processes;
'strategies to help manage the financial risks posed by this hardest-to-help group (fortnightly interviews with minimum additional help, or referral to non-charging voluntary organisations or other benefits). Substantial investment is only made if the client is offered a job interview.' [39]

More recent research has indicated that, while EZ providers are no longer systematically 'parking' less job-ready clients, they do concentrate their efforts on those who are most enthusiastic:

'While a few advisers did admit to focusing on 'easy hits,' generally speaking, the amount of time and money invested in any one client is determined by how responsive and demonstrably committed to working the client is.' [40]

This may be less discriminatory, but it is still a selection process which will tend to benefit those who are already most advantaged. And, whatever may be true of EZs, recent evaluation of the Action Teams for Jobs - which is paid for using the outcome-related funding the government favours for implementing the Green Paper reforms - found that creaming and parking continue to be a problem in that programme:

'The main advantage of outcome-related funding for PSL teams was seen to be the clear focus on moving clients into employment rather than focusing on soft outcomes. Conversely, the main disadvantage was felt to be that it incentivised working with easier-to-help clients, as there was little incentive to help those with multiple barriers closer to employment. In terms of the Action Team funding system as a whole, the main advantage seen by Jobcentre Plus and PSL teams was the flexibility, enabling teams to respond to client needs and to prioritise resources effectively for their local area. The main disadvantage cited by Jobcentre Plus teams related to recent decisions taken at District level to prioritise resources on areas of provision other than Action Teams. The main disadvantage of the funding system cited by PSL teams was the lack of funding for 'distance travelled'.' [41]

Overall, the Private Sector Lead Action Teams were out-performed by those from Jobcentre Plus:

'The 25 PSL teams as a whole only met 78 per cent of their job entry targets in year one of Phase 3 of Action Teams, compared to the 40 Jobcentre Plus teams, as a whole, who achieved 140 per cent of their job entry targets. PSL teams, as a whole, achieved 69 per cent of their outcomes from non-JSA customers, compared to Jobcentre Plus teams, as a whole, who achieved 76 per cent (again, exceeding the target of 70 per cent). PSL teams, as a whole, moved into work proportionately more clients who had only been out of work for a short time than Jobcentre Plus teams. They were also proportionately more likely to work with clients with just one of the target disadvantages than Jobcentre Plus teams, as a whole, were.' [42]

We are also concerned about the risk that private sector organisations may treat personal information about clients simply as another business asset. Identity fraud is a serious problem, and private sector organisations' security standards may well not be as high as those in the public sector. Many claimants will be much more uncomfortable about giving sensitive information to a representative of a private company than to a public servant.

The public interest in maintaining a public employment service also has a geographical dimension, with the loss of the public sector commitment to maintain a nationwide presence, regardless of how unprofitable it might be to operate in any given district. Further, there would be a real risk of the loss of transparency in public services, as more and more important information about the performance of government policies became inaccessible because it was 'commercial-in-confidence.' And, finally, there is a strategic issue, as the loss of a public sector presence in delivery can impair policy development, as feedback from the operational end of the benefit system is lost.

The Australian experience indicates some of the dangers of privatisation for voluntary organisations. (In 1998 the Commonwealth Employment Service was wound up, and replaced by the private and voluntary sector delivered Job Network.) As the Australian Council of Social Service has noted, community organisations and charities participating in delivering formerly public services come under the same budget pressures the public sector previously faced, forcing them to become more 'business like', making them reluctant to criticise government policy and thus endangering their ethos. Organisations that used to develop new ideas and meet unmet needs are now so busy with 'core business' that their role as the spice in the national recipe has disappeared, a factor that is increasingly worrying voluntary organisations:

'The role of non-profit community organisations is reduced to providing a function or service defined by government for the best possible price (which may or may not be set by government). Some go so far as to argue that the theory itself prevents a greater role for "providers" in identifying needs and developing solutions to meet them, because such a role might be construed as a "conflict of interest" or "unfair advantage" when the time for distributing funds arrives.' [43]

In an outcome-related funding system, small organisations cannot risk becoming involved in uncertain programmes that do not guarantee that their start-up costs and overheads will be covered. Larger charities and companies, on the other hand, have the resources to balance this risk against the likelihood that ORF will provide them with sufficient income to meet these costs. A major expansion of private and voluntary sector contracting, but funded on an ORF basis could therefore lead to fewer partner organisations working with JCP and less variety. The loss of variety certainly seems to have been the Australian experience.

This section of the Green Paper is, as we have noted, somewhat vague, so it is difficult to estimate just how extensive the government's plans are. The more extensive they are, the more difficult it will be for the TUC to support the Green Paper as a whole.

The long-term

In a final section, the government announces that it is considering, in the longer term, moving towards a single benefit for all working age claimants 'with appropriate additions for those who have caring responsibilities and those with a long-term illness or disability.' [44]

The TUC understands that the new Employment Support Allowance will bear a similarity to JSA. Just as JSA brought together contributory Unemployment Benefit and means-tested Income Support for unemployed people, so the ESA brings together contributory IB and means-tested IS. Just as JSA now comes in means-tested and contributory versions, so too will the ESA.

It will obviously be a lot easier, after these reforms, to merge the two to make a single new working age benefit. Whether this would be a good thing or not would depend upon the terms on which it took place:

Levelling up benefit rates to the ESA standard would be welcome; levelling them down to JSA levels would not.
Unions would also want to make sure that disabled people and carers did not face the availability for work conditions currently applied to JSA claimants.
And we would not want the contributory version of a working age benefit to be time limited like JSA (currently just 6 months).

Recap: specific points in the TUC comments

The government's aspiration towards an eighty percent employment rate is welcome.
There is no incapacity crisis.
And therefore no need for draconian reforms.
Overall, the government's approach is correct, and avoids the most regressive reforms.
The TUC has supported Health, work and well being , but preventing illness and injury is even more important.
The abolition of waiting days in Statutory Sick Pay is tremendously welcome; abolition of employers' obligations whilst retaining waiting days would be extremely unwelcome.
In principle, we welcome a shift from assessing the severity of impairment to the severity of the impact of the impairment on the ability to function.
It will be difficult fairly to assess individual disabled people's suitability for work-related activities, but accurate assessments are essential. Fair assessments will be more expensive than current arrangements, and the TUC will oppose the reforms described in the Green Paper if the assessment arrangements are not adequately resourced.
To aid people with fluctuating conditions the TUC would urge the government to reform benefits earnings disregard to allow them to be calculated over a longer period than one week.
As it will be operating a stricter system, which introduces sanctions to disabled people's benefits for the first time, Jobcentre Plus must become fully accessible.
Mandatory action plans would not be acceptable if spending on employment programmes for disabled people were to be reduced, and the action plan regime should be loosened if the labour market slackens.
JCP should write to sick and disabled people who are about to be sanctioned, telling them what they need to do to avoid this happening.
People who have been complying with their action plan obligations for a year or more should then move to a less stringent regime, with looser obligations.
The basic allowance of the Employment and Support Allowance should include carer's and bereavement premiums.
The basic rate of the Employment and Support Allowance should not be set at lower rates for young people.
People waiting for their assessment should be paid at a rate equal to Statutory Sick Pay, not Jobseeker's Allowance.
Claimants' partners who are disabled themselves should continue to be able to qualify for the disability premium.
People who become disabled early in life should continue to qualify for the contributory version of the Employment and Support Allowance without having to have an adequate contributions record.
The government should guarantee that rates of the new benefit will be set to provide the same total level of spending on benefits for disabled people as at present.
The work-related activity premium for lone parents is welcome. It is important to avoid increased conditionality, as parents are themselves the best judges of what their children need.
The plans for new delivery arrangements could be a threat to the continued existence of a public employment service. In addition to obvious concerns about jobs and working conditions, we are also concerned about the possible impact on unemployed and economically inactive people.
In the longer term, a single working age benefit should be judged in pragmatic terms: levelling up rates and conditions to the ESA standard would be welcome, levelling them down to JSA levels would not.

A positive approach

This section of the document presents the TUC's considered position on the welfare reform agenda proposed in the Green Paper; it is designed as our contribution to the wider debate the government has called for. This part of the document can stand apart from the previous section, and is designed for use after the consultation on the government's proposals has ended.

The starting point for a positive approach to employment opportunities for people currently categorised as 'economically inactive' must be an understanding of the situation now. Here the priority must be tackle three common misconceptions about Incapacity Benefit - the number of disabled people in Britain is often under-estimated, Incapacity Benefit is not out of control and there is very little evidence of fraud or widespread malingering.

These misconceptions underlie many calls for a 'get tough' approach to IB reform, but this would be the wrong approach. The Pathways to Work programme, which has achieved great success by supporting disabled people into jobs is a much better approach. Unfortunately, the Department for Work and Pensions budget cuts are a serious threat to the chances of helping large numbers of Incapacity Benefit claimants to return to employment.

How common are sickness and disability?

In the debate about welfare reform one of the commonest mistakes made by journalists and politicians is to look at the history of improvements in medicine and rising standards of living, and to conclude from this that the number of sick and disabled people must be falling.

But this common assumption is wrong: depending on the measure we use, up to a third of people are sick or disabled. Firstly, the 2001 census shows about one person in eleven reporting themselves as having 'not good health':

General health, England and Wales, 2001 (all ages) [45]

	Number	Proportion
Good health	35,676, 210	68.6%
Fairly good health	11,568,363	22.2%
Not good health	4,797,343	9.2%

The census also reports that more than one person in six has a limiting long-term illness:

Limiting long-term illness, England and Wales (all ages) [46]

	Number	Proportion
With a limiting long-term illness	9,484,856	18.2%
Without a limiting long-term illness	42,557,060	81.8%
All people	52,041,916	100%

And the Family Resources Survey shows about one person in three having been ill enough in the previous four weeks to have needed 'something on prescription':

Individuals by medical treatment in the 4 weeks before the interview [47]

Received something on prescription	Visited dentist for NHS examination or treatment	Had an eyesight test	Purchased glasses or contact lenses	Visited hospital for NHS treatment
31%	10%	4%	3%	8%

These figures are for all ages, but the working age figures are surprisingly high. Twenty percent of 35 - 39 year-olds ('prime age' workers) received something on prescription in the previous four weeks, 11% visited a dentist, 3% had an eyesight test, 3% purchased glasses or lenses and 7% visited a hospital for treatment.

Disability is more complicated because it is not the same as either sickness or incapacity for work; despite discrimination, negative stereotypes and poor access most working age disabled people have paid jobs. [48] Disability is also more complicated because it is notoriously difficult to define for statistical purposes. Fortunately, when it comes to working age disabled people, the different estimates that are available produce very similar figures, with between 15.7% and 20% of the working age population being disabled. [49] People are often surprised that there are two and a half million people receiving Incapacity Benefit. But there are also three and a half million disabled people in employment and a quarter of a million unemployed [50] - are hardly likely to be claiming to be disabled to get themselves an easy life on incapacity benefits.

No one is certain why the number of sick people is higher than some might expect, and no one knows for sure why at least one working age person in six is disabled, but this is undoubtedly the case. One reason may simply be that this is what should be expected in an ageing society: older people are more likely to be disabled:

Adults in Great Britain likely to be covered by the DDA, by age [51]

Age (years)	Millions	Percent
All adults aged 16+	9.8	22%
16-24	0.4	8%
25-34	0.7	9%
35-44	1.1	13%
45-54	1.6	20%
55-64	2.1	30%
65+	4.1	47%

It is sometimes pointed out that Incapacity Benefit claims are higher in some regions, and that these tend to be regions with higher unemployment. It is sometimes suggested that this indicates that these claimants are fraudulent, and that many should be claiming Jobseeker's Allowance instead.

Incapacity Benefit claimants by Government Office Region, Feb 2005 [52]

Region/Country	Number	As a proportion of the local population (%)
Wales	184,900	6.4%
North East	154,200	6.1%
North West	386,700	5.7%
Yorkshire and The Humber	216,300	4.4%
West Midlands	215,400	4.1%
London	275,300	3.8%
East Midlands	154,300	3.7%
South West	160,600	3.3%
East of England	148,600	2.8%
South East	199,800	2.5%

But the fact is that the proportion of the population who are sick or disabled is also higher in these regions.

Proportion of local population who are disabled by region [53]

Region	Proportion of disabled people in local population (%)
North East	26
Wales	24
North West and Merseyside	21
Yorkshire and Humberside	21
East Midlands	21
Scotland	21
West Midlands	19
South West	19
London	17
South East	17
Eastern	16

Proportion of local population with a limiting long-term illness in Wales and English regions [54]

Region/Country	Proportion with a limiting long-term illness (%)
Wales	23
North East	23
North West	21
Yorkshire and The Humber	19
West Midlands	19
East Midlands	18
South West	18
East of England	16
London	15
South East	15

Proportion with 'not good' general health in Wales and English regions [55]

Region/Country	Proportion with 'not good' general health (%)
Wales	12
North East	12
North West	11
Yorkshire and The Humber	10
West Midlands	10
East Midlands	9
South West	9
East of England	8
London	8
South East	7

What is happening to Incapacity Benefit?

IB is a benefit for people unable to work because of illness or disability, paid at three rates, ranging from £57.65 to £76.45. Additional allowances can increase these amounts by up to a further £60, but 93% of claimants receive less than £100 per week.^[56] As a proportion of average earnings, the Incapacity Benefit paid to a single person who qualified for the long-term rate fell from 17.4 per cent in April 1995 to 14.7 per cent in April 2004. ^[57]

Contrary to received wisdom, the number of people who are getting Incapacity Benefit is falling, not rising. As we have already seen, there is a certain amount of confusion caused by the fact that sometimes the government talks about 'Incapacity Benefit' when what it means is 'incapacity benefits' - including Income Support paid to working age disabled people. It is the latter that has grown, not Incapacity Benefit.

As we can see, only one of these benefits is called Incapacity Benefit, but IB, SDA and IS with a disability premium are frequently referred to as 'incapacity benefits'. All too often, discussions about benefit reform begin by pointing to the growing number of people getting benefit, and then moved on to discussions about how best to reform IB.

This glides over a key fact: the number of people of IB claimants has grown only slightly. If we take IB and SDA together (and the two have effectively been merged since 2001) it is falling:

Numbers of IB and SDA claimants [58]

Benefit	May 1997	Feb 2005	Change
Incapacity Benefit	2,370,500	2,387,000	+ 16,500
Severe Disablement Allowance	368,700	295,000	- 73,700
Net	2,739,200	2,682,000	- 57,200

More importantly, we need to distinguish between the number of people who claim a benefit, and the number who actually receive it. During the same period the number of beneficiaries of both IB and SDA has fallen:

Numbers of IB and SDA beneficiaries [59]

Benefit	May 1997	Feb 2005	Change
Incapacity Benefit	1,732,700	1,444,800	- 287,900
Severe Disablement Allowance	367,100	294,400	- 72,700
Net	2,099,800	1,739,200	- 360,600

We need to distinguish working age beneficiaries from those over pension age. A major element of this debate is about how best to move people from 'incapacity benefits' to employment, and this is not applicable to those over retirement age. Rule changes have drastically reduced the number of beneficiaries over state pension age, and this age group accounts for nearly half the reduction in the number of beneficiaries. But even if we limit ourselves to beneficiaries of working age there has still been a large reduction for both benefits:

Numbers of working age IB and SDA beneficiaries [60]

Benefit	May 1997	Feb 2005	Change
Incapacity Benefit	1,560,400	1,444,800	- 115,600
Severe Disablement Allowance	328,500	250,900	- 77,600
Net	1,888,900	1,695,700	- 193,300

These figures are reflected in spending on Incapacity Benefit, which has been falling since 1995.

IB expenditure, Great Britain, 1997/8 to 2007/08 (£million, 2005/6 prices) [61]

	1997/98	1998/99	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08
Short-term lower rate	382	331	313	308	310	302	286	274	267	263	254
Short-term higher rate	381	357	315	363	379	342	319	300	293	296	291
Long-term	6,874	6,733	6,313	6,218	6,212	6,101	5,956	5,871	5,770	5,679	5,560
Earnings-related	1,277	1,078	865	789	572	507	468	390	306	259	220
Total IB spending	8,914	8,499	7,805	7,677	7,473	7,253	7,030	6,835	6,636	6,497	6,325

It is the same story when we come to Severe Disablement Allowance:

SDA expenditure, Great Britain, 1997/8 to 2007/08 (£million, 2005/6 prices) [62]

	1997/98	1998/99	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08
Total	1,201	1,154	1,157	1,151	1,151	1,028	979	942	899	851	786

Finally, official data 'flow' of people onto Incapacity Benefit show that, far from being out of control, the number of people starting a claim for the important long-term rate of the benefit has been very steady indeed. The figures for everyone starting a claim (i.e., including short-term rates of the benefit) show a significant fall, of about a quarter over the last eight years:

IB commencements in first quarter, 1998 to 2005 [63]

Date	All Incapacity Benefit	Incapacity Benefit (long-term)
1998	209.7	8.0
1999	198.1	6.3
2000	190.4	7.4
2001	186.2	7.5
2002	173.1	7.3
2003	173.5	7.8
2004	167.4	7.4
2005	127.6	6.7

The number of people receiving Income Support with a disability premium has risen substantially in recent years - from 827,000 in May 1997, to 1,124,000 in February 2005, [64] an increase of 297,000, though this figure includes children receiving the Enhanced Disability Premium brought in by the current government (i.e., the result of a policy change and therefore presumably intended) and the increase in the number of working age beneficiaries will be a little smaller.

We should not, therefore, be surprised to find that spending on Income Support for working age disabled people is higher than it was eight years ago, though it is worth noting that is has been quite stable for three years:

Expenditure on IS for long-term sick and disabled people under 60 , GB, 1997/8 to 2007/08 (£million, 2005/6 prices) [65]

	1997/98	1998/99	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07	2007/08
Total	3,163	3,396	3,604	3,952	4,332	4,346	4,567	4,704	4,649	4,468	4,194

To summarise: the number of claimants of IB has risen slightly, but the number of claimants of IB and SDA together has fallen, and the number of beneficiaries has fallen even more, even when we limit our scope to people of working age; spending on IB and SDA has fallen; the numbers receiving Income Support with a disability premium has risen, and spending has fluctuated, but risen overall.

Fraud

Incapacity Benefit fraud is rare. The 2001 Benefit Review of IB found that fraud levels were so low the review team did not have enough examples to measure them properly, and had to rely on an estimate instead, producing a figure of less than one percent. The most recent measurement exercise produces an even lower figure, of 0.1%, the lowest of any major benefit. Incapacity Benefit accounts for six percent of benefit spending, but just one percent of benefit fraud:

Benefit spending and fraud, by benefit, 2004-5 [66]

Benefit	Spending (£bn)	Spending on this benefit as a proportion of all benefit spending	Fraud (£bn)	Fraud in this benefit as a proportion of all fraud	Fraud as a proportion of spending on this benefit
Income Support	10.0	9.0%	0.25	27.2%	2.5%
Jobseeker's Allowance	2.2	2.0%	0.07	7.6%	3.0%
Pension Credit	6.1	5.5%	0.06	6.5%	1.0%
Housing Benefit	13.1	11.8%	0.21	22.8%	1.6%
Disability Living Allowance	8.1	7.3%	0.04	4.3%	0.5%
Retirement Pension	48.8	44.0%	0.03	3.3%	0.1%
Carer's Allowance	1.1	1.0%	0.04	4.3%	3.9%
Incapacity Benefit	6.7	6.0%	0.01	1.1%	0.1%
Instrument of payment fraud			0.04	4.3%
Interdependencies			0.01	1.1%
Council Tax Benefit (estimate)	3.6	3.2%	0.06	6.5%	1.6%
Other unreviewed benefits	11.4	10.3%	0.1	10.9%	0.9%
TOTAL	£110.9 bn	100%	£0.92 bn	100%	0.8%

The Department is suspicious of the fact that many claimants move on to IB from Jobseeker's Allowance, not directly from employment; in 2001 DWP commissioned a study of people moving between JSA and IB, which failed to find evidence that these moves are fraudulent:

'Moves from JSA to IB/IS among claimants in our sample mostly seem to have been appropriate, and were usually caused by the onset, recurrence or deterioration of a health problem. Both BA and ES staff allege a range of situations in which this move is made inappropriately in an attempt to manipulate the system, but there were few signs of this in the research. Such cases no doubt exist and should be dealt with, but we suspect they may be fairly marginal in numbers.'^[67]

A better way

The TUC is committed to the equality of disabled people. We believe that, when barriers to equality are removed, disabled people have shown repeatedly their ability to perform on equal terms in the same occupations as non-disabled people. Barriers to equality can include systematic discrimination, attitudes and practices, inaccessible workplaces and equipment and the barriers in other walks of life (such as housing, education and transport) that make it difficult for many disabled people to compete on equal terms in the labour market.

The TUC agrees that Incapacity Benefit claimants and other disabled people who are looking for paid work should be helped to get jobs. We strongly support the government when it refuses to write anyone off as 'unemployable'. We have supported every anti-discrimination measure the government has introduced to give disabled people a better chance of competing for jobs in the open labour market.

But we do not wish to see theoretical rights being used to justify concrete obligations. The equality of disabled people will be achieved via anti-discrimination legislation, but also through the removal of barriers, such as accessible transport and housing, inclusive education, a free health service, social benefits to meet the extra costs of impairment, accessible workplaces and workstations. Some of these social rights have been achieved, such as the NHS. But others are still objectives, not realities:

The Access to Work scheme, which helps employers meet any extra costs involved in employing a disabled person, has always been under-funded. Governments have repeatedly refused to publicise this scheme - disabled people have long suspected that there is a deliberate intention to ration the scheme through ignorance.
Disabled people are twice as likely as non-disabled people to have no qualifications. Disabled 19 year olds are more than twice as likely as non-disabled coevals 19 year olds to not be in education, training or employment and half as likely to be in higher education. [68]
The Disability Discrimination Act will not require all rail vehicles to be fully accessible till 2020.
The Disabled Facilities Grant (money from local authorities to help pay for adaptations to homes) is very useful, but insufficiently funded - some disabled people get nothing, some not enough to meet their needs, others face very long waits.
Involuntary admissions to psychiatric services have been on the increase - there was a 24% rise between 1990 and 2001. [69]
At the last general election 68% of polling stations failed a basic access test. [70]

In this context, it is particularly important to note the inadequacy of disability benefits to the task of meeting the extra costs of being disabled. In 2004, budget standards research for the Disability Alliance and Rowntree [71] found that disabled people face extra costs in most areas of everyday life. These costs include one-off items of equipment (often expensive); recurring costs such as personal assistance and higher 'normal' costs, such as more expensive food or higher heating bills. The authors of the study developed a set of budget standards for people with different levels of need, but all based on one disabled person living alone in suitably adapted rented accommodation. The maximum benefit entitlement of the hypothetical claimants was substantially below the level of costs established by the standards:

Maximum weekly benefits compared with disabled person budget standards (excluding PA and housing costs)

Needs Level	Maximum Benefits	Budget Standard	Unmet Costs	Benefits as a Percentage of Costs
High-medium	£235	£467	£232	50%
Intermittent/Fluctuating	£90	£298	£208	30%
Low-medium	£79	£279	£200	28%

These figures exclude personal assistance costs (which accounted for over half the costs for people with high-medium needs and for those with hearing impairments).

Today's reality is that substantial progress has been made towards equal legal rights and adequate social provision for disabled people, but there is still a very long way to go. The responsibilities of disabled people must take account of this reality, and the material fact about IB claimants is that they still face real obstacles to employment that are linked to their impairments and/or illnesses.

In 2001 a government-sponsored survey of people who moved from Incapacity Benefit to Jobseeker's Allowance showed that it was significantly more difficult for them to get jobs than it was for other JSA claimants: ^[72]

On average, 28% of all disabled and non-disabled people claiming JSA were still on the benefit a year later.
But, for people who moved there from IB, the figure was 45%.

This was despite the fact that this group might be assumed to have some advantages compared with both people who stayed on IB (who would probably be further from the labour market) and compared with other JSA claimants, as the researchers found that their commitment to employment was such that they were substantially more likelyto say that they would accept any job they could get (39%, compared with 32%).

The TUC draws two conclusions from this discussion of the rights and responsibilities of Incapacity Benefit claimants in society that still has some way to go to achieve disability equality. One is that the government is right to offer support to any disabled person who is trying to get a job. There should be no impairment test for this offer; no one should be 'written off'.

The other is that it would be a mistake to force reluctant disabled people into the workforce. The government has repeatedly pointed out that there are one million disabled people who say they want jobs. This is an important group, but the evidence quoted above suggests that many will require a lot of help removing barriers before they get paid work; the government should therefore concentrate its efforts on supporting this group.

The TUC supports Pathways to Work

The TUC has strongly supported the government's 'Pathways to Work' project - a pilot programme, designed to help IB claimants into jobs. The main elements of these pilot projects, introduced in 2003, are:

Mandatory Work Focused Interviews (WFIs);
A £40 per week Return to Work Credit for up to a year;
New specialist IB Personal Advisers;
'Condition management' programmes, offering enhanced rehabilitation services;
A 'Choices' package of extra support.

In the pilot areas twice as many Incapacity Benefit claimants have found jobs as in other areas, and up to six times as many people are taking up provision such as rehabilitation or the New Deal. This level of success on a national scale could reduce the IB caseload by more than 100,000 cases a year. [73]

Although it is a supportive programme, Pathways to Work is not an 'easy touch'. The work-focused interviews are compulsory, and claimants who do not take part in them face the loss of their benefits. The TUC has taken the view that it is reasonable to expect people to attend interviews where they can find out about help available to return to paid work, and has supported the work-focused interviews.

The TUC was particularly pleased that last year's DWP five year strategy emphasised plans to invest in Pathways to Work ('on the road to making this a nationwide offer' [74] ) as the basis for Incapacity Benefit reform: 'building on the extension of Pathways, we will reform the benefit.' [75] For the TUC, the decision to support the reforms announced in the five-year strategy was very strongly influenced by this promise.

This is, in large measure, a reflection of our belief that the government has responsibilities too, and it would be unfair for it to increase obligations for disabled people on benefits without accepting an equivalent obligation itself. The Bank of England has noted that 'the generosity of disability benefits has fallen significantly since the recession of the early 1990s,'^[76] and the UK has always under-performed in terms of spending on active labour market programmes for disabled people. In 2003 the EU average for spending on active labour market programmes for disabled people was 0.114% of GDP; in the UK the equivalent figure was just 0.02%; of the then 15 EU members, only Italy spent a lower proportion.^[77] Pathways to Work marks a welcome break with this traditional failure.

Engaging employers

Employers' also have duties. In January, a 'work audit' by the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development [78] looked at the attitudes of a representative sample of 750 employers, drawn from all sectors of the economy, and found some shocking results:

Thirty three percent said that they deliberately exclude people with a history of long-term sickness or incapacity when recruiting staff.
By contrast, just three percent had a positive policy of targeting this group for recruitment.
60% thought they would be more likely to take sickness absence.
45% thought they would be less reliable.
43% thought long-term IB claimants would be less productive.
32% thought they would be less reliable.
19% said they would produce a lower standard of work.
17% thought them less capable of teamwork.
16% thought they were not committed to customer service.
Just 26% thought they 'had potential.'

This confirms what disabled people have long believed. For instance, the Royal National Institute for Deaf People's submission to the Work and Pensions Committee's inquiry into the reform of Incapacity Benefit commented:

'It is a stark fact that many employers will simply not engage disabled people, or those people coming straight from incapacity benefits. If the national rollout of Pathways to Work is successful, work needs to be done to ensure that there is sufficient demand for the skills and experience that disabled people have to offer.' [79]

Similarly, a recent study of older people out of employment found that 'the IB claimants were firmly of the view that their conditions served to act as a stigma in the eyes of employers.' [80] This is not just a matter of subjective impressions - a recent cross-sectional study using Labour Force Survey data found that 'disabled people are approximately three times more likely to exit work than their non-disabled counterparts.' [81] This level of prejudice and discrimination underscores just how dangerous it would be to go too far in threatening IB claimants with benefit sanctions if they do not engage in the government's paid work agenda. It also indicates the need to reconsider the issue of employers' obligations. The health and safety sections of the Green Paper already go some distance towards improving employers' ability to make their workplaces healthier and to retain workers who become sick or develop impairments:

Pilot programmes on prevention of injuries and ill-health and the management of sickness absence and return to work;
An occupational health advice line for GPs;
Developing the role of safety representatives.

But it is also important to encourage employers (and recruitment agencies) to recruit people coming off Incapacity Benefit. The Disability Discrimination Act already outlaws much of the discrimination revealed by the CIPD survey, and employers' organisations and trade unions can do more to publicise its provisions. The TUC also supports the Disability Rights Task Force recommendation that employment tribunals should be given the power to order reinstatement or re-engagement in discrimination cases brought under the DDA (or SDA or RRA), in line with provisions in the Employment Rights Act, in place of the existing power just to recommend it.

Extra responsibilities for employers which might help to counter the extreme prejudice revealed above might include duties to plan for the retention in employment of workers who become sick or disabled - past experience suggests that employers who already have personal experience of working with a disabled employee are much more likely to have positive attitudes. The extension to disabled people of the right to request flexible working arrangements would also be very positive; Macmillan, the cancer charity, has explained how this could help:

'All the cancer patients we spoke to had been in work when they were diagnosed and most were keen to return to work after treatment. They already had the skills to return to their jobs but many patients found it difficult to return to full-time work straight away. Most of the patients interviewed felt that support from their employers was the most important thing in order to allow them to return to the workplace. This is supported by evidence from the Macmillan benefit advisers who told us that what many patients needed was a phased or gradual return to work and that employers needed to be more flexible, e.g. altering working hours and allowing time off for medical appointments.' [82]

These duties should be balanced with extra support. The TUC is a strong supporter of the Access to Work scheme, which provides financial support for employers who face extra costs as a result of employing a disabled person. Access to Work is a tremendous success - for every individual helped by the scheme there is a net benefit to the Exchequer of almost £1,400, and to the economy of almost £3,000. The current government deserves to be praised for having increased spending on AtW from £14.6m in 1997-8 to £60m in 2006-7, and the number of beneficiaries has risen from 13,000 to 32,000. [83]

Nonetheless, there continues to be more demand for AtW than the budget for the scheme can support, which probably explains why, like its predecessor, the government has refused to publicise it. As a result, few disabled people know about that Access to Work exists, and employer awareness is probably at an even lower level. Many of the employers with discriminatory attitudes uncovered by the CIPD survey would probably have had a different approach if they had known about Access to Work.

Notes

[1] A New Deal for Welfare: empowering people to work, DWP, 2006, ('the Green Paper') p iv.

[2] Op cit, available at http://www.tuc.org.uk/welfare/tuc-11467-f0.cfm

[3] Press release of 23-1-06, available at http://www.tuc.org.uk/welfare/tuc-11277-f0.cfm

[4] Green Paper, cap 2, available at http://www.dwp.gov.uk/aboutus/welfarereform/docs/A_new_deal_for_welfare…

[5] Experiences of the Job Retention and Rehabilitation Pilot, Christopher Farrell, Katharine Nice, Jane Lewis and Roy Sainsbury, DWP Research Report No 339, 2006, p 6.

[6] Ibid, p 34.

[7] Ibid, p 37.

[8] Ibid, p 48.

[9] The Employment Rates of Disabled People, Richard Berthoud, ISER for DWP, Research Report 298, March 2006. Uses data about 2,255 disabled people from the Health and Disability Survey (HDS) attached to the Family Resources Survey (FRS) in 1996-97.

[10] Ibid, p 68.

[11] NAS submission to Work and Pensions Committee Inquiry into incapacity benefits and Pathways to Work, 2005, para.s 10 & 11.

[12] Mind submission to Work and Pensions Committee Inquiry into incapacity benefits and Pathways to Work, 2006, para 2.2.

[13] What the Doctor Ordered?, NACAB, 2006, pp 8 & 9.

[14] Quoted in 'Reforms Need Doctoring', John Wheatley, Guardian, 2 March 2006.

[15] Private correspondence, Ron Parr.

[16] Op cit, para 91.

[17] 'Hutton's Green Paper has a lot to answer for', Disability Now, accessed from the website at http://www.disabilitynow.org.uk/news/newsfoc_mar_2006_003.htm on 07/04/2006 12:17.

[18] A People First spokesman said: "We are worried that not enough thought about people with learning difficulties has gone into this paper and our fears have been increased by the fact that the government has not even thought about giving us a fair chance to read the paper and give our views." Ibid.

[19] Op cit, p 15.

[20] Op cit, p 43.

[21] Commons Hansard, 7 Feb 2006, col 1164W.

[22] Op cit, note 18.

[23] Ibid, pp 77 -8.

[24] Ibid, p 7.

[25] Op cit, fig 2.4.

[26] Currently the personal allowances for JSA are £57.45 a week for those over 25, £45.50 for those aged 18 - 24 and £34.60 for 16 and 17 year olds.

[27] Op cit, para 79.

[28] You get more the younger you were when you became disabled; this was introduced to recognise the fact that people who became disabled earlier in life had had less opportunity to build up savings.

[29] Green Paper, p 42.

[30] Fraud and technology Crimes: findings from the 2002/03 British Crime Survey and Offending, Crime and Justice Survey 2003, Home Office Online Report 34/05, Debbie Wilson (ed), 2005, table 2.1. 'Of those eligible' means, for benefit fraud, those who claimed any benefit; for income tax fraud those who said they were eligible to pay income tax. Uses data for people aged 18 - 65 from the Offending, Crime and Justice Survey 2003. The income tax fraud question covers 7,077 respondents; the benefit fraud question covers 1,942 respondents. If we take as the basis all respondents, 1.9% admitted to committing income tax fraud and 0.5% to benefit fraud.

[31] See, for instance, ibid, p 7.

[32] NAO press release for the Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General of HM Customs & Excise, 13 February 2002. This figure was a minimum, as the Department had not yet completed their assessment of fraud in VAT.

[33] A 1998 European Commission report suggested that undeclared income in Britain lay at between £58 and £108 billion a year. ('Top QC to pursue black economy and dole cheats', David Brindle, Guardian, November 10, 1999.) Even if we assume some of this income would not have been liable for tax if declared, and that much of the rest would have been taxed at lower rates, £10 billion per annum would be a very conservative estimate.

[34] Ibid, p 56.

[35] Ibid, p 57.

[36] Ibid, p 10.

[37] Ibid, p 77.

[38] 'Britain's Relative Productivity performance', Mahoney and de Boer, Economic Review, NIESR, March 2002.

[39] Qualitative Evaluation of Employment Zones: A Study of Local Delivery Agents and Area Case Studies¸ A Hirst et al, DWP, 2002, para 15.

[40] Evaluation of Single Provider Employment Zone: Extensions to Young People, Lone Parents and Early Entrants - Interim Report, Rita Griffiths and Gerwyn Jones, Research Report No 228, Insite Research and Consulting for DWP, 2005, p 27.

[41] Review of Action Teams for Jobs, Jo Casebourne, Sara Davis and Rosie Page, Research Report 328, IES for DWP, 2006, p 2.

[42] Ibid, p 4.

[43] 'Public and private sector roles in social services', speech by Michael Raper, President of the Australian Council of Social Service to the 2000 International Conference on Social Welfare, based on Common Cause? relationships and reforms in community services, ACOSS Paper 102, November 1999.

[44] Ibid, p 92.

[45] Calculated from 2001 census data, Table UV20 accessed at http://neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/ on 21/09/2005 16:01

[46] Calculated from 2001 census data, Table UV20 accessed at http://neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/ on 21/09/2005 16:11

[47] Taken from Family Resources Survey, 2003 - 4, ONS, Table 2.21.

[48] Calculated from Disability Briefing, Disability Rights Commission, June 2005, table 1.

[49] Review of Disability Estimates and Definitions, M Bajekal, T Harries, R Breman and K Woodfield, National Centre for Social Research for DWP, In-house Report 128, 2004, pp 2 - 3. The Labour Force Survey suggests that 19% of working age people are disabled (Disability Briefing, Disability Rights Commission, June 2005, table 1.)

[50] Disability Briefing, Disability Rights Commission, June 2005, tables 1 and 2.

[51] Family Resources Survey 2002-03, quoted in Disability Briefing, Disability Rights Commission, Dec 2004, p 34.

[52] Calculated from 2001 census data, table UV01, accessed at http://neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk on 26/09/2005 12:56 and Incapacity Benefit and Severe Disablement Allowance Quarterly Summary Statistics: February 2005, DWP, table 1.6, excluding overseas claimants.

[53] Autumn 2004,LFS data, not seasonally adjusted. Disability Briefing, Disability Rights Commission, June 2005, table 7. A study by Tania Burchardt using data from the British Household Panel Survey found a very similar regional pattern (Being and Becoming: social exclusion and the onset of disability, T Burchardt, CASE, CASEreport 21, 2003, fig 2.1).

[54] Calculated from 2001 census data, Table UV22 accessed at http://neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/ on 23/09/2005 15:27. Data not available for Scotland.

[55] Calculated from 2001 census data, Table UV20 accessed at http://neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/ on 23/09/2005 15:48. Data not available for Scotland.

[56] Calculated from figures obtained from Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study, DWP Information Directorate, http://193.115.152.21/100pc/ib/amtgp/ccsex/a_carate_r_amtgp_c_ccsex_aug… accessed on 27/02/2006 18:14.

[57] Abstract of Statistics, DWP, 2004, table 5.5. There are similar falls for people with dependents and those with adult dependants.

[58] Incapacity Benefit and Severe Disablement Allowance Quarterly Summary Statistics: Feb 2005, DWP, tables IB1.1, IB1.2 and SDA1.1. Unfortunately the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study does not provide data for before 1999.

[59] Incapacity Benefit and Severe Disablement Allowance Quarterly Summary Statistics: Feb 2005, DWP, tables IB1.4 and SDA1.1.

[60] Incapacity Benefit and Severe Disablement Allowance Quarterly Summary Statistics: Feb 2005, DWP, tables IB1.4 and SDA1.1.

[61] Benefit expenditure tables, DWP, table 4, updated December 2005, accessed at http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd4/medium_term.asp on 27/02/2006 18:29. 1996/7 to 2003/4 are outturn; 2004/5 is estimated outturn, 2005/6 to 2007/8 are plans.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Incapacity Benefit and Severe Disablement Allowance Quarterly Summary Statistics: Feb 2005, DWP, table IB1.9. Unfortunately the WPLS does not provide commencement data. DWP notes that 'figures prior to 2004 are subject to minor changes;' 'figures for 2004 include fewer late notifications than previous quarters and will be subject to greater change in future'; and 'figures for the latest quarter do not include any late notifications and are subject to major changes in future quarters. For illustration purposes, total commencements for February 2004 increased by 22% in the year following their initial release.'

[64] Income Support Quarterly Statistical Enquiry: February 2005, table IS2.7.

[65] Benefit expenditure tables, DWP, table 7, updated December 2005, accessed at http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd4/medium_term.asp on 27/02/2006 18:45.

[66] Calculated from table on Resource Accounts 2004-5, DWP, 2006, p 81, accessed at http://www.dwp.gov.uk/publications/dwp/2006/dwp_resource_account.pdf on 28/02/2006 17:46. 'Interdependencies' are overpayments due to knock-on effects between loss of DLA component entitlement and premiums on means-tested benefits. HB estimates include approximations, and are different from those published previously as National Statistics. CTB fraud has not been measured and is assumed to be equal to the rate of fraud in HB. The accounts say that 'the estimated rate of fraud and error on unreviewed benefits, for which we have no reliable review information, has been set at 2.7% and divided equally among fraud, customer error and official error.'

[67] Moving between sickness and work, Alan Hedges and Wendy Sykes, DWP Research Report No 151, 2001, p. 2.

[68] Citizenship and Disabled People, Jenny Morris for the Disability Rights Commission, April 2005, p 13. Accessed at http://www.drc.gov.uk/disabilitydebate/uploads/Citizenship_and_disabled…

on 27/09/2005 12:13.

[69] Ibid, p 16.

[70] Information from the 'Polls Apart' campaign, Scope, 2005. Accessed at www.pollsapart.org.uk on 27/09/2005 12:18.

[71] Disabled people's costs of living: 'More than you would think', Noel Smith, Sue Middleton, Kate Ashton-Brooks, Lynne Cox and Barbara Dobson with Lorna Reith, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2004.

[72] Well Enough to Work?, Karl Ashworth & Yvette Hartfree, Centre for Research in Social Policy, and Augusta Stephenson, Policy Studies Institute for DWP, Research Report No 145, July 2001.

[73] 'Plan cuts incapacity claims', Patrick Wintour, Guardian, 3-9-04.

[74] Opportunity and Security Throughout Life, DWP, 2005, pp 8 & 46.

[75] Opportunity and Security Throughout Life, DWP, 2005, p 47.

[76] Health, Disability Insurance and Labour Force Participation, Brian Bell and James Smith, Bank of England Working Paper 218, 2004, p 8.

[77] Taken from European Social Statistics: labour market policy - expenditure and participants, European Commission, 2003 data, published 2005, table B.1.3.

[78] Incapacity Benefit Reform: why it is needed and how to engage employers, John Philpott, CIPD, 2006.

[79] Op cit, p 4.

[80] Out of Sight and Out of Mind: the older unemployed and their search for work, paper for the 2004 'Work, Employment and Society' conference, by Wendy Loretto and Phil White, pp 22 -3 accessed at www.britsoc.co.uk/ on 30/01/06 15.46.

[81] Labour Market Disadvantage Amongst Disabled People: a longitudinal perspective, John Rigg, CASEpaper 103, CASE, Nov 2005.

[82] Work and Pensions Committee Inquiry into incapacity benefits and Pathways to Work: Submission by Macmillan Cancer Relief, 2006, para 5.2.

[83] Commons Hansard Written Answers, 20 Mar 2006.

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